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Comments  and 
Discussion 
Marvin  H. Kosters:  This paper  by Mitchell  presents  interesting  evidence 
on factors  that  influence  rates  of wage  change.  Some  of the results  mainly 
confirm  what  other  studies  have stated;  for example,  that  nonunion  wages 
show more responsiveness  to slack than union wages, and that first-year 
union  wage increases  also show a significant  response.  Other  results  pro- 
vide new insights  into wage behavior  by indicating  that differences  in re- 
sponsiveness  to prices and unemployment  are related  to such factors  as 
contract  duration,  escalators,  and  other  characteristics  of wage setting. 
By working  with data at levels of aggregation  that take into account 
differences  in institutional  arrangements  for wage setting,  Mitchell's  ap- 
proach  gives  some  insight  into how the timing  of wage  changes  is affected. 
While opinions  differ  about preferred  definitions  of variables  and forms 
of the equations,  working  with similar variables  and equations  across 
groups  facilitates  comparisons  among  them. In some instances,  methods 
that need to be used to construct  the data series  are inevitably  crude,  but 
Mitchell is careful to point out ways in which the econometric  results 
might  be affected  by the  ways  he assembled  his data. 
There are a number  of points about  details  in the paper  that could be 
noted. I will mention  two that  relate  to construction  of the data.  First,  in 
developing  the manufacturing  data,  Mitchell  apparently  used  medians  for 
early years for which means were not available.  While differences  be- 
tween medians  and means are not large for later years when most non- 
union workers  received  wage increases  each year, only a small majority 
actually  received  general  wage increases  in earlier  years.  For example,  in 
1961 and 1962, only about 53 percent  of nonunion  workers  in manu- 
facturing  received  wage increases,  and median  adjustments  are accord- 
ingly  extremely  small.  Second,  in constructing  estimates  of deferred  wage 
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increases  for contracts  with escalators,  escalator  payments  made during 
the first  year are combined  with all increases  received  later, and the an- 
nual rate is computed  over the entire  life of the contract.  While this is 
consistent  with methods  used by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  it can in- 
fluence  the deferred  wage  increase  variable.  For retrospective  analysis  of 
this kind, a case can be made  for following  the more straightforward  ap- 
proach  of including  escalator  payments  made during  the first  year with 
other first-year  increases,  at least as an alternative  to the approach  that 
was followed. 
The paper  explores  what  the evidence  seems  to indicate  about  the ex- 
tent  to which  wages  are  responsive  to demand  restraint  and  whether  some 
sort  of direct  intervention  to influence  contract  duration  or the size of par- 
ticular  settlements  might  contribute  to restraining  the wage trend.  While 
Mitchell  does not make a strong  statement  of his views on the possible 
contribution  of some form of direct intervention,  he casts doubt on the 
idea that a limited  number  of bargaining  situations  can be identified  that 
would  have a major  influence  on overall  wage  trends,  even  if a direct  and 
significant  effect on such situations  were sometimes  feasible.  Moreover, 
in his analysis  he does not regard  the mandatory  controls  of 1971-74, 
or for that matter  the guideposts  of the 1960s, as having  exerted  much 
influence  on wages. I have no real disagreement  with these judgments 
about the effects of policies intended  to exert direct influence  on wage 
trends. 
It is possible  to view the evidence  as indicating  little responsiveness  to 
demand  restraint.  Mitchell  characterizes  the responsiveness  to unemploy- 
ment as relatively  small and as having  a disproportionate  impact  outside 
the union sector. The reasoning  is that response  to slack is modest and 
limited mainly  to nonunion  and first-year  union wage increases.  More- 
over, the evidence on union wage responsiveness  is apparently  partly 
attributable  to short-term  contracts  in the sample, and short-term  con- 
tracts  have recently  been less prevalent  than they were earlier.  A small 
slowdown  in wage increases  for only a part  of the work force limits the 
extent  of price deceleration  that stems from this source, and continuing 
price increases  tend to support  continuing  wage increases  more or less 
throughout  the economy. 
It is also possible,  however,  to interpret  the evidence  less pessimisti- 
cally. The estimates  reported  in table 1 suggest  a 0.4 percentage  point 
wage response  for nonunion  and first-year  union wage increases  to a 1 
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Mitchell  points out, however,  only about  28 percent  of private  nonfarm 
wage and salary  workers  are  unionized.  Moreover,  the direct  response  to 
unemployment  extends also to first-year  union wage increases,  which 
typically  cover  more  than  one-third  of union  workers  each  year.  This  per- 
mits the preponderant  share of the estimated  wage reduction  to be re- 
flected  in prices,  even if nonwage  components  of price  remain  unchanged. 
Further,  although  deferred  wage  increases  are  not affected  directly  by the 
higher  unemployment,  long-term  contracts  with escalators  show a pro- 
nounced response  to contemporaneous  price increases  and are thus in- 
directly  affected.  Hence the initial  direct  effects  of unemployment  operate 
indirectly  through  prices-quite quickly  for contracts  with  escalators  and 
with longer lags for other contracts.  If the higher unemployment  con- 
tinues, first-year  wage increases  for expiring  contracts  will be affected 
directly  as well. The main  point here is that looking  only at initial  direct 
effects can give a misleading  impression  about the quantitative  signifi- 
cance  of the wage  response.  Indirect  effects  through  prices  should  also be 
taken  into account  in tracing  out the dynamics  of the process  as it works 
over time. 
The reference  I have made  to price  sensitivity  places  some reliance  on 
the coefficient  estimate  showing contemporaneous  price increases  fully 
reflected  by deferred  wage  increases  for major  unions (table 1). Mitchell 
cautions  against  taking  this estimate  at face value,  but I believe  he could 
place more reliance on the estimate.  Although there is a great deal of 
variety  in escalator  provisions,  I think  there  has been a real increase  in 
proportionate  payoffs  in recent years. When the period 1973-76 is ex- 
cluded  from the regression,  the size of the coefficient  for contemporane- 
ous price  increases  is markedly  smaller;  this could be expected  not only 
as a consequence  of whatever  distortion  may have been introduced  by 
computation  methods,  but also as a result  of higher  proportionate  payoffs 
under  escalators  during  this period. 
I am in general  struck  by the sensitivity  to prices  shown  by the regres- 
sion estimates  for the union  sector.  In both types  of regressions,  estimates 
for first-year  wage  increases  show  they almost  fully  reflect  price  increases. 
Over  the life of contracts,  particularly  for contracts  with  escalator  provi- 
sions, prices also seem to be quite fully reflected.  My reading  of the re- 
gression estimates  suggests that proportionate  payoffs  under escalators 
have recently  exceeded  the 0.57 ratio suggested  in the paper,  an estimate 
that  is based  on an average  for the past ten years  using  data  that  in some 
respects  tend to underestimate  the ratio. For the data from which these 586  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
escalator  payoff ratios are estimated,  for example, escalator  payments 
near the beginning  and end of contracts  that are applicable  to only part 
of the calendar  year are included in the numerator  of the ratio even 
though, as Mitchell's estimates  suggest, first-year  wage increases  may 
fully reflect  price increases  during  the year in which new contracts  are 
negotiated. 
Mitchell also develops some estimates  of union wage prospects  for 
1979. My overall  impression  is that these estimates  are more  likely  to be 
too low than too high. In the context  of the method  used for developing 
the estimates  and his unemployment  and  inflation  assumptions,  there  are 
three  main reasons  for this judgment.  First,  the use of the overall  unem- 
ployment  rate  makes  the assumed  unemployment  level higher  relative  to 
historical  experience  than would be the case if one of a number  of "ad- 
justed"  unemployment  measures  were  used. Second,  the escalator  payoff 
ratio estimates  that are used may be about a tenth of a point too low. 
Third,  it is possible  that the relative  wage measure  stabilizes  or even de- 
clines somewhat  during 1978, partly as a result of the minimum  wage 
increase  and partly  as a consequence  of tighter  labor  markets.  For com- 
parison  purposes,  I note that mean effective  wage increases  for major 
unions  in the private  nonfarm  sector  averaged  8.1 percent  in 1977, when 
unemployment  was higher  and  inflation  was lower.  With  construction  ex- 
cluded,  the average  increase  would  be slightly  higher.  While  Mitchell  does 
not put forward  a directly  comparable  overall  estimate,  the estimate  im- 
plicit in the data he presents  is apparently  about 8 percent  or somewhat 
lower. 
If unemployment  and price behavior  during 1979 are similar  to the 
estimates  that were used in calculating  the projections,  average  wage  im- 
creases  for workers  covered  by major  collective  bargaining  agreements 
are likely to exceed the 7 percent  figure  in the Carter  administration's 
guidelines.  No settlements,  of course,  would  necessarily  need  to be incon- 
sistent  with  the guidelines  for this  result  to occur.  However,  in view of the 
dispersion  in the size of individual  wage settlements  that has been the 
usual experience  in recent  years, the guidelines  are likely to be severely 
strained  if not discredited  completely  by wage settlements  at the high  end 
of the range. 
Michael  L  Wachter:  There are two major  parts of the Mitchell study. 
The first  explores  the issue of whether  unions  contribute  to the difficulty Daniel J. B. Mitchell  587 
of restraining  inflation.  The second  analyzes  some relatively  unused  data 
on union contracts  in the context of the Phillips curve. Both parts are 
relatively  distinct.  Because  of the nature  of the data,  the empirical  evalua- 
tion brings  little new insight  into the wage inflation  mechanism. 
Mitchell  is to be commended  for his careful  inspection  of the data on 
union wage contracts.  The analysis  of the first-year  and life-of-contract 
wage increases  and the differences  between  escalated  and nonescalated 
contracts  yields interesting  insights.  Mitchell also adopts a simple  wage 
equation  consisting  of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics'  unemployment  rate 
and rate of change  of prices (lagged one period) to explain  these data. 
Although  I believe  that  the inclusion  of many  variables  in a wage  equation 
(for example,  introducing  discouraged  worker  unemployment  rates) can 
be counterproductive,  Mitchell's  equations  may be too simple.  Much of 
the current  debate  on wage equations  involves  differences  in unemploy- 
ment constructs;  the dynamics  of the wage-wage,  wage-price,  or wage- 
money supply spiral; and the issue of shifting coefficients  over time. 
Mitchell's  equations  are not adapted  to shed light on any of these ques- 
tions. 
The value of the equations  is that they provide  information  for com- 
paring  Mitchell's  diverse  collection  of dependent  wage variables.  The re- 
sults  of regressing  wage  inflation  on the BLS unemployment  rate  and  one- 
period lagged prices are well known. As a result, a comparison  of the 
equation  that uses the standard  dependent  wage variable  with Mitchell's 
nonstandard  dependent  variables  indicates  something  about  the behavior 
of these latter  variables.  That is, the interest  is on the new left-hand  side 
variables  rather  than  on new  right-hand  side  ones. 
The problem  with  this approach,  however,  is that  it cannot  reveal  much 
new information  about the wage inflation  mechanism.  Mitchell's  discus- 
sion of these issues is thus based as much  on his earlier  work as it is on 
the empirical  findings  of this  paper. 
Mitchell's analysis of the union role in the wage inflation  process 
focuses on two points: the ability  of demand  restraint  to bring  about a 
deceleration  in union  wage  gains  and  the role of escalator  clauses  in main- 
taing  or causing  inflation.  He then addresses  the wage  outlook  for 1979 
and the possible  role for an incomes  policy. 
I disagree  strongly  with  Mitchell's  position  on the lack of effectiveness 
of demand  management  in the inflation  process.  A low coefficient  on the 
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not imply an ongoing  inflation  process  that will not respond  to the level 
of aggregate  demand.  In previous  papers I attempted  to illustrate  this 
point in two ways.' First,  the lagged  wage or price  term  can be replaced 
by a lagged  variable  for money supply.  In this simple, "quasi-reduced" 
form  of the equation,  wages  respond  to unemployment  and  money-supply 
growth  rates. The notion of an ongoing  wage-wage  or wage-price  push 
cycle is broken  by the obvious  role of the money  supply.  It is difficult  to 
argue  that aggregate  demand  variables  are  not crucial  in a wage  equation 
that contains both a  significant  unemployment  variable and lagged 
money-supply  growth variables (with a sum of coefficients  equal to 
unity). Second,  the coefficients  of the wage equation  shift systematically 
over time, and there  is evidence  that the responsiveness  of wage  inflation 
to demand variables  is increasing.  For example, the role of escalator 
clauses  should  be expected  to have a significant  impact  in shortening  the 
transmission  mechanism  through  which demand  management  alters  the 
inflation  rate. 
In  general, I  agree with Mitchell in  his  evaluation of  escalator 
clauses.  Escalators  alter  the inflation  mechanism,  but there  is no reason 
to assume  that escalators  themselves  have an independent  effect on the 
inflation  rate.  In addition,  escalators  are  likely  to be important  in the effi- 
cient workings  of the micro exchange  relationships.  Attempts  by macro 
planners  to tamper  with these contracting  schemes  can have serious  ad- 
verse  effects. 
I see little evidence  in this paper  to support  an argument  that unions 
are a source  of today's  inflation  problem.  In the early 1960s the average 
inflation  rate was approximately  1.5 percent.  Today,  the "built-in"  infla- 
tion rate appears to  be  approximately  7  percent. Are labor unions 
stronger  today than they were in the 1950s and 1960s? What is the 
mechanism  through  which  they have somehow  managed  to boost the in- 
flation  rate? 
In the political  arena,  labor unions  have lost as many  battles as they 
have won in the past few years. The defeat of the labor reform  bill of 
1978 is an important  indicator  of the political  strength  of unions. 
After decades of slow union growth,  it is difficult  to believe that the 
nonunion  sectors  are more  fearful  of being  organized  now by new unions 
than  they were  in the 1950s. (A few exceptions  exist, however.) That  is, 
1. See, for example, Michael L. Wachter, "The Changing Cyclical Responsive- 
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if a "threat  effect"  exists  from  the unionized  sector,  leading  to wage  spill- 
overs,  it was stronger  in the noninflationary  1950s than  in the inflationary 
1970s. 
The "problem"  union areas seem to change over time. In the early 
1970s contract  construction  and the municipal  sectors  were accused  of 
fomenting  cost-push  wage inflation.  Six years  later they have the lowest 
rate of wage growth.  Why are they not labeled as a source  of wage de- 
celeration?  Today,  the problem  areas  include  steel and mining.  But these 
are  certainly  special  examples.  Underground  mining  is an occupation  that 
will require  relative  wage  gains  if employment  is to be increased.  I believe 
that wage increases  in mining  would be above average,  in the current 
energy  context,  whether  or not the industry  were  unionized.  The steel in- 
dustry  is a special case because of difficulties  of handling  the new no- 
strike  provision.  Wages  in the steel industry  are  probably  now out of line, 
but if additional  import  protection  is denied,  I believe  that they will fall 
back into line over the next one or two bargaining  sessions. 
And in terms  of the outlook  for 1979 and 1980, I believe  that  the in- 
flation  issue depends  crucially  on whether  the monetary  and  fiscal  policy- 
makers  lower the unemployment  rate significantly  below its current  level 
of 6 percent.  If the economy  overheats  again,  the inflation  rate will cer- 
tainly accelerate.  But once again, as has traditionally  been the case, the 
nonunion  sectors,  responding  to tight  labor  markets,  will  lead  the  way  into 
higher  levels of wage  inflation.  Union wage  policy  is an indicator,  but not 
a cause  of today's  inflationary  pressures. 
General  Discussion 
Several  Brookings  panel  members  discussed  the responses  of wages  to 
unemployment  among Mitchell's  various  wage disaggregations.  Franco 
Modigliani  was surprised  at the finding  that  first-year  changes  in wages  in 
the major  union  sector  were as sensitive  to unemployment  as wages  in the 
nonunion  sector.  Albert  Rees noted  that the sizable  response  of wages  in 
the union sector  to unemployment  came  from  the short-term  contracts  in 
the sector.  He pointed  out that these were dominant  early  in the sample 
period  and  suggested  dividingthe  penrod  for  estimation  purposes.  Mitchell 
replied  that short-term  contracts  arose not only because  some contracts 
were negotiated  to be short-term  but also because long-term  contracts 590  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
were interrupted.  As explained  in the text, when the latter were inter- 
rupted,  the calculated  annual  wage increase  for the terminated  contract 
could be much higher  than originally  bargained,  and the new contract 
could provide  a large  increase  as well. Mitchell  added  that his estimates 
of overall  responsiveness  to unemployment  were comparable  with aggre- 
gate  studies  such  as George  Perry's  (BPEA,  2:1978). 
Robert  Hall pointed  out that  unions  negotiated  an entire  wage  relation 
rather  than a wage, and that actual  wage costs under  this relation  would 
be more responsive  to economic  conditions  than  Mitchell's  data showed. 
The wage-drift  process  by which  wages are changed  through  worker  re- 
classification  might  reveal  considerably  more  flexibility  in wages.  Greater 
flexibility  was also achieved  by overtime  payments,  while  the introduction 
in some contracts  of employer benefits to supplement  unemployment 
compensation  added a different  irregularity  to the labor cost function 
facing  the firm. 
Michael  Wachter  suggested  that  the situations  in which  short-term  con- 
tracts  were negotiated  merited  attention.  In particular,  were these  identi- 
fiable as situations  in which the unions were gaining or losing power? 
Mitchell  agreed  this was an interesting  topic for investigation  and noted 
that the construction  industry  was an example  of an industry  in which 
shorter-term  contracts  reflected  the bargaining  weakness  of the union. 
Modigliani  was puzzled  that the number  of long-term  contracts  had in- 
creased  over time,  when  one would  have anticipated  a shortening  of con- 
tract duration  in response  to uncertain  inflation  rates. He did not think 
escalator  clauses  could substitute  perfectly  for shorter-term  contracts  be- 
cause these usually gave only partial  protection  against  price inflation. 
Hall noted that the change  to long-term  contracts  had occurred  prior  to 
the acceleration  in inflation;  and Rees added  that there  had in fact been 
some movement  back to shorter  contracts  in recent  years. 
Laurence  Seidman  felt that for evaluating  tax-based  incomes  policies, 
it would  have been useful  to have explored  the effects  of profits  on wages 
using the contract  file. Mitchell  replied  that this was difficult  to do with 
the contract data for unions that negotiated a single agreement  with 
several  firms  in an  industry. 
Hall found it significant  that someone with Mitchell's  expenrence  in 
wage control  should  be unenthusiastic  about  government  intervention  in 
wage  setting.  Mitchell  said his principal  doubts  on intervention  were  with 
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if influenced,  would  in turn  influence  other  wages.  But he did not believe 
guidelines  could do much  harm.  He also conjectured  that the reason  for 
the ambiguity  about  the nature  of the inflation  process,  whether  the link- 
ages  were  wage-wage  or wage-price,  might  indicate  that  people  are  uncer- 
tain  about  inflation  and  search  for an indicator,  so that  if a guideline  num- 
ber were made credible,  it might have an influence  on wage decisions. 
William  Fellner  said the interesting  question  was whether  the coefficients 
governing  the wage-price  process  would  change  if a permanent  change  in 
policy  behavior  could achieve  credibility.  He believed  that  the new round 
of formalized  incomes  policy  would  fail and  be followed  by a more  cred- 
ible fiscal  and  monetary  disinflation,  which  would  lead to changed  coeffi- 
cients.  Edmund  Phelps objected  that the presently  estimated  coefficients 
carried  the influence  of other  disinflationary  periods.  But Fellner  replied 
that few had believed the policymakers  were committed  to curing  infla- 
tion in these  earlier  periods;  he added  that  disinflationary  fiscal  and  mone- 
tary policy had worked  in other countries.  However,  Stephen  Goldfeld 
observed  they did not have long contracts  and a staggered  bargaining 
procedure,  so that  their  experience  might  not be applicable  to this  country. 